We consider the problem of routing a number of communication requests in WDM (wavelength division multiplexing) all-optical networks from the standpoint of game theory. If we view each routing request (pair of source-target nodes) as a player, then a strategy consists of a path from the source to the target and a frequency (color). To reflect the restriction that two requests must not use the same frequency on the same edge, conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost.
Introduction
Optical networks use as physical means for transferring data lightwaves which are transmitted through optical fibers. As current technology may handle lightwaves with bandwidth several orders of magnitude higher than electrical signals, optical networks may reach a peer-to-peer transfer rate far greater than any electrical network. In standard optical networks however, data have to be converted from the optical to electrical form when passing through an intermediate switch and converted back to optical form for retransmission to the next station. This conversion costs in time and reduces the transfer rate to tens of GHz. In all-optical networks however, the signal retains its optical form from the transmitting to the receiving end, thus achieving transfer rate of the order of tens of THz.
To better exploit the high bandwidth of all-optical networks, all-optical network protocols are based on wavelengthdivision multiplexing, WDM, which in a sense divides the available high bandwidth in several channels. Each channel uses a different frequency (wavelength) thus allowing the simultaneous connection of several source-destination pairs through the same fiber, provided that they use different frequencies.
The efficient allocation of frequencies given a set of requests from pairs of hosts wishing to communicate, poses several interesting theoretical problems. It is common in this setting to view the network as a connected graph with its nodes being hosts or switches and its edges being the optical fibers that provide the actual communication. The available frequencies (i.e. different channels) of an edge are represented as different colors and by the above each edge has a palette of different colors from which a pair of communicating hosts may choose. Notice that, since we do not allow wavelength conversion, a path has to use the same color for all its edges and of course if two paths use the same edge, they must use different colors.
The main problem therefore, is the so called Routing and Path Coloring problem in which we are given a set of pairs of hosts (nodes in the graph) wishing to communicate and we are asked to provide for each pair a path and a color in such a way that no two pairs whose paths share an edge are colored the same and in addition the total number of colors used is minimized.
This problem has been shown to be NP-hard even for rings [10] but can be solved in polynomial time for chains [22] and bounded degree trees [19] . A natural way to tackle its hardness is to look for approximation algorithms and there are many known results for a variety of different topologies such as trees, rings and meshes. For example, a 2-approximation algorithm for rings is presented in [26] and a randomized algorithm with ratio better than 2 is known from [16] .
Another natural problem is Maximum Routing and Path Coloring (MaxRPC): Given a graph G, a set of requests R (pairs of nodes) and a number of colors w we try to find an assignment of paths to a subset of requests A ⊆ R and a coloring of these paths with different colors for overlapping paths, such that |A| is maximal. The above problem is NP-hard even for rings (via a straightforward reduction from Routing and Path Coloring). Efficient approximation algorithms for various topologies are given in [21, 2] . Other related work includes multi-fiber models [20, 17] , models that use wavelength conversion [27] and also on-line algorithms for the same problems [2, 3] . Another approach that has been recently followed to study network problems is the game-theoretic one. Several researchers have studied the behavior of networks in general, focusing especially in congestion problems using the powerful tools of game theory. We briefly mention here the results in [12, 23, 13, 29] , where network congestion and routing games are studied under different game-theoretic settings. The main issue there is the study of the existence of pure Nash equilibria and the complexity of computing them. Moreover, in [13] the social cost of Nash equilibria is also examined. In Ref. [12] , the problem of computing a pure Nash equilibrium for general congestion games, symmetric congestion games and asymmetric network congestion games is shown to be PLS-complete and a P-time algorithm is presented for symmetric network congestion games. Moreover, the results of that paper are derived using local search techniques, so the question of whether such methods may be applied to different game settings, reasonably arises. A model very close to ours with utility function identical to our cost function 3 (see Section 5) is studied in [6] regarding the price of stability and the price of anarchy under several topological properties of the network. A general result regarding matroid and weighted matroid congestion games with non-decreasing delay functions is presented in [1] , where these games are shown to possess a Nash equilibrium.
In this paper, we study all-optical WDM routing under a game theoretic approach. In our setting, we view each pair of communicating nodes as a player in a non-cooperative game. The player's strategies are the different path-color pairs from which he may choose, first to route his communication (the path) and second, to assign a wavelength to it (the color).
Naturally, a game setup requires some cost function which represents the cost of a player in a state where each player has chosen some specific strategy. A state in which a player feels comfortable with his strategy, i.e. his cost does not decrease if he decides to follow another strategy, is called an equilibrium. J.F. Nash, in his classical paper [18] , showed that every game has a mixed equilibrium but not necessarily a pure one. An important question therefore in a game setting is whether it has a pure equilibrium.
Here we consider several different natural cost functions in WDM all-optical networks and study for each one of them the following questions:
(1) Are there any pure Nash equilibria? (2) Can we decide in P-time if a strategy profile is an equilibrium? (3) Can we compute an equilibrium in P-time? (4) If we consider a computed equilibrium as a local optimum, can we find a solution (equilibrium) of better value?
The game theoretic approach in all optical networks has been studied in [5] focusing in problems 1 and 3 above and with cost functions similar to two of the cost functions studied here. Another extension is examined in [4] where also the level of knowledge of the network that the agents possess is taken under consideration. Different levels of knowledge are examined varying from total knowledge of other agents strategies to partial and local knowledge only.
Notice that we do not yet have a general efficient algorithm for finding Nash equilibria (and, a fortiori, pure Nash equilibria). This has become a famous open problem in computational complexity theory. The reader may see Refs. [9, 7, 12, 24, 25] for recent results on this issue.
Giving efficient algorithms for the above questions means that in an all-optical network under some specific routing conditions, a communicating pair has efficient algorithms to decide if it is better off defecting from the current solution, or if better global solutions exist. Likewise, negative answers to the above problems mean that no practical algorithms for these questions exist.
Moreover (inspired by a flaw in a previous version of this work [15] ), we give an algorithm for computing a pure Nash equilibrium in a related problem in which each node wants to broadcast a message in a WDM network.
Our results show that under different cost functions the complexity of recognizing a Nash equilibrium varies from NPcomplete to polynomial time. Actually, we were led in redefining the cost function, in an attempt to lower the computational complexity of answering some of the above questions. The new cost functions are also natural and lead to re-posing some of the much studied optimization problems in WDM all-optical networks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section we give some preliminaries and formally define the setting of the problems. In the next 4 sections we study the above questions for four different cost functions. In Section 7 we examine the broadcast problem and finally, in Section 8 we summarize our results and state some open problems.
Preliminaries
A network is, for our purposes, a graph G = (V , E). A routing request is simply a pair of nodes (s, t) with s, t ∈ V . We are given a set of M routing requests (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , M. We are also given colors which we represent as integers in the interval C = [1..c], where c is the maximum number of available colors. A solution to the requests is a set of M paths of G, p i , i = 1, . . . , M and a set of M colors χ i , i = 1, . . . , M with path p i having as endpoints the nodes s i and t i . If p i ∩ p j = ∅ for i = j then χ i = χ j . This last requirement models the already stated assumption that if any two requests are routed through edge-intersecting paths, then they must use different wavelengths (colors).
A game with n ≥ 2 players is defined by a finite set of strategies S i , i = 1, . . . , n and n payoff functions u i , i = 1, . . . , n one for each player, mapping S 1 ×· · ·×S n to the integers. The elements of S 1 ×· · ·×S n are called states. A state s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) is called a pure Nash equilibrium if for every i, u i (s 1 , . . . , s i , . . . , s n ) ≥ u i (s 1 , . . . , s i , . . . , s n ) for any s i ∈ S i . A game may not have pure Nash equilibria, but Nash in [18] proved that there always exist mixed Nash equilibria (we consider as strategy any possible distribution on S i ). We now view an all optical network G with M requests as a (non-cooperative) game in the following way.
where p i is a path from s i to t i and χ i is a color (wavelength). We represent colors as integers in the interval [1.
.c]. • Cost: For each player i = 1, . . . , M a cost function g i (σ 1 , . . . , σ M ).
In this paper we study the above questions under different cost functions. In all cost functions we are considering, conflicting strategies are assigned a prohibitively high cost. Moreover, in all cases it is implicit that bandwidth is the main resource that needs to be carefully managed. This is reflected in the number of colors used (this is actually our first cost function that charges a path according to the number of conflicts with other colors), the color number used on a path (note that this is a different measure than the previous one and is equivalent to charging a path according to the frequency it uses, the higher the frequency the greater the cost), the most saturated link (in terms of the different paths that use it) and the highest color number (chromatic level) on a link (this charges links not paths, that use high frequency).
Cost function 1: Number of different colors
The first cost function we consider is the number of different colors that are used along a player's path. That is, for all players their corresponding cost function is
where X (e) is the set of colors that are used for edge e. In other words, |X(e)| is the number of different paths that use e.
Under this cost function a player's possible defect is toward the direction where he has fewer conflicts with different colors.
Having defined the cost function, we first attack the problem of recognizing whether a given strategy profile, under this cost function, is a pure Nash equilibrium. (Actually, the precise statement of the problem asks the negation of that, i.e. whether a specific state is not a Nash equilibrium.) We call this problem Nash Recognition:
. . , M}, such that there are no conflicts. • Question. Is there an i such that nodes s i and t i can be connected via a different path and/or a different color, with less cost under cost function g?
For cost function 1 it turns out that even recognizing a Nash equilibrium is NP-complete.
Theorem 1. Nash Recognition under cost function 1 is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because given a path we can check in P-time the number of different colors that arise on it. To prove completeness we will use the known NP-complete problem 1-in-3-3SAT without negation [14] :
1-in-3-3SAT-WN
• Instance: A boolean formula with 3 positive literals per clause:
• Question: Is there a satisfying truth assignment such that exactly one literal per clause is true? 
We construct an instance of problem Nash Recognition in the following way.
(1) For every variable in C we introduce m new colors.
(2) We introduce m + 2 new ''universal'' colors.
(3) For every clause C i we construct a graph component as follows.
• We introduce 2 nodes x i , y i which we connect with 3 disjoint chain paths with µ i1 , µ i2 , µ i3 edges respectively, where µ ij , j = 1, 2, 3 is the total number of occurrences of variable u ij in C . • For every edge (x, y) introduced by the 3 chain paths, we consider 2 more nodes a, b, 2 edges (a, x) and (y, b) and a player starting at a and terminating at b.
• For every (a, b)-player the instance includes the path (a, x, y, b) as part of the strategy. • Every (a, b)-player in a (x i , y i ) chain gets a different color from the set of m colors of the respective variable. (4) Every graph component connects to the next through an edge (y i , x i+1 ). (5) For chains that belong to the same variable we choose the same color for the corresponding (a, b)-players. (6) We introduce a new chain with m + 1 edges starting at node x 1 and terminating at y m . For this chain we introduce m + 1(a, b)-players exactly like we did in the component chains. These players use m + 1 of the m + 2 universal colors. The last universal color is used by a player (x 1 , y m ) who follows the chain and his cost is obviously m + 2.
An example of the described construction is shown in Fig. 1 .
We observe that in the constructed instance every player has cost 1, except (x 1 , y m ) who has cost m + 2 and the (a, b)players in the ''long'' chain who have cost equal to 2. Also, every (a, b)-player has obviously no better strategy, so we turn our attention to the (x 1 , y m ) player.
If there is a satisfying truth assignment for C, then considering player (x 1 , y m ) (the only possible defect) we have that, in order to find a better strategy (with cost at most m + 1) we must deal with the (x 1 , y m ) paths that use the clause-component chains. Consider the (x 1 , y m ) path p that in every component uses the chain of the only satisfied literal. The cost of p is 1 + occ(u) = m + 1, where the sum is over all variables u of the 1-in-3-3SAT-WN instance that have been assigned true in the satisfying assignment and occ(u) is the number of occurrences of variable u in the formula. So, there is a player who can change his strategy to a better cost. For the other direction consider a situation where there is a player that can defect.
Obviously this player is (x 1 , y m ) (with better cost equal to m + 1). We construct a satisfying assignment for C by setting, in each clause, to true the variable with the chain component that is used by player (x 1 , y m ). Then we have the following:
• Only one literal in each clause is set true. • The assignment is consistent. Every variable we set to true charges the path with as many colors as the number of its occurrences. So, an inconsistent assignment results in a cost greater than m + 1. This case is absurd since we assumed that the player can improve his strategy resulting to cost equal to m + 1. • The path passes through all the components, so the assignment satisfies every clause in C .
This shows that there exists an appropriate satisfying truth assignment, thus completing the proof.
Despite the high complexity of recognizing an equilibrium (or, in other words, a possible defect), we can always be sure that an equilibrium exists. In fact, the existence of pure Nash equilibria is assured by a polynomial potential function as it is shown in the next theorem. Theorem 2. Pure Nash equilibria according to Cost Function 1 always exist.
Proof. We consider a feasible solution (initial feasible coloring) that uses a different color for each player. That is, if there are M players, then player i uses color i, i = 1, . . . , M. Such a solution always exists since the network is connected and there are no color conflicts. We then examine every player's strategies in order to detect and apply possible defects. During this process players who defect never change their color. Since we start from an initial solution with a different color for each player and players never change colors, it is assured that a color conflict will never arise.
The existence of a pure Nash equilibrium is proved by the following potential function:
where S is a feasible solution ((p 1 , 1) , . . . , (p M , M)) and c(p i ) is the cost of player i, that is the number of different colors (or players) on his current path.
If nobody can defect we are at an equilibrium point. If there is a player i, using path p i , of cost k that defects to cost k < k (path p i ), then we have the following. The cost of player i obviously decreases. Moreover, initially k − 1 players' costs decrease since they no longer conflict with player i on path p i and afterwards k − 1 players (possibly some of these players are the same) increase their cost due to conflicts on p i . So, since k − 1 < k − 1, a defect leads to a smaller Φ(S), thus at the end we must reach an equilibrium.
The next problem we deal with is whether, given an equilibrium there is a better one. The metric we use to compare two Nash equilibria is the maximum color number they use or, equivalently, the number of different colors used: an equilibrium is better than another if it uses less colors. Notice that this problem is closely related to Routing and Path Coloring, mentioned in the introduction but here part of the problem instance is a strategy that is a Nash equilibrium. However this additional fact does not lower the problem complexity:
Better Nash.
• Instance. Graph G, k players (s i , t i ) and a Nash equilibrium using m colors under a cost function g. • Question. Is there a Nash equilibrium under cost function g using less than m colors?
Proposition 1. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 1 (Number of Different Colors) is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because we can count in polynomial time the total number of different colors used, by examining all edges one by one and recording the different colors we meet. In order to prove completeness we use the NP-complete problem k-Disjoint Paths [11] .
k-Disjoint Paths
• Instance. Graph G, k pairs of nodes (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , k. • Question. Is there a set of k edge disjoint paths between the nodes (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , k?
Given an instance of k-Disjoint Paths, G, (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , k, we construct the following instance of Better Nash (G , (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , 2k): (See Fig. 2) • In order to construct G we add in G for each (s i , t i ), the vertices a i , b i , T i and the edges (s i , a i ), (a i ,
• The equilibrium point that completes the construction uses paths (s i , a i , T i ) with color 1 for the (s i , T i ) players and paths (a i , T i , t i , b i ) with color 2 for the (a i , b i ) players. Notice that these strategies are indeed an equilibrium.
If there is a set of k disjoint (s i , t i ) paths in G then there is an equilibrium point in which every player uses color 1. At this point players (s i , T i ) use this set of edge disjoint paths along with edges (t i , T i ) and players (a i , b i ) use the paths (a i , s i , b i ).
Conversely, if there is a better Nash equilibrium then it uses only one color. So, every (s i , T i ) player uses only edges of G and edges (t i , T i ), because otherwise there is a conflict with (a i , b i ) players and the number of colors needed is more than one. Since players (s i , T i ) must use the same color on graph G, the (s i , t i ) sub-paths that they use are edge disjoint.
Cost function 2: Color number
In order to relax the constraints of the first function we turn our attention to the following definition of the cost:
Intuitively, under this cost function a player's possible defect is toward the direction of lower numbered colors i.e. lower wavelengths. Under cost function 2 things are computationally easier. Pure Nash equilibria always exist and can be recognized and computed in P-time using the following greedy, online algorithm. We point that Theorem 1 in Ref. [5] also states that a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time. Find an (s 1 , t 1 ) path and assign it color 1. for i = 2, . . . , M do for χ = 1, . . . , M do Remove from G the edges belonging to paths colored χ.
Check if there exists a path between s i and t i .
if YES then use it with color χ and break out of the for-loop over χ.
end end
First notice that the above procedure will always assign a path and a color to every player (s i , t i ) since there are as many colors as players and the graph is connected. Moreover, the resulting path coloring is a pure Nash equilibrium because no player can defect: player (s 1 , t 1 ) has the minimum cost (color 1) and every player (s i , t i ), i = 2, . . . , M gets the minimum possible color.
Since there is a P-time algorithm to compute an equilibrium it is natural to ask for a better one with respect to the total number of colors used.
Proposition 2. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 2 (Color Number) is NP-complete.
Proof. The problem is obviously in NP because we can count in polynomial time the total number of different colors used, by examining all edges one by one. In order to prove completeness we reduce again k-Disjoint Paths to it.
Given an instance of k-Disjoint Paths, G, (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , k, we construct the following instance of Better Nash (G , (s i , t i ), i = 1, . . . , 2k) which resembles that used in the proof of Proposition 1 (See Fig. 3 ).
• In order to construct G we add in G for each (s i , t i ), the vertices a i , b i and the edges (s i , a i ), (a i , t i ), (t i , b i ) and (b i , s i ).
• The new players are (s i , t i ) and (a i , b i ) for i = 1, . . . , k.
• The equilibrium point that completes the construction uses paths (s i , a i , t i ) with color 1 for the (s i , t i ) players and paths (a i , s i , b i ) with color 2 for the (a i , b i ) players.
The reasoning is analogous to that in Proposition 1. If there is a set of k disjoint paths in G then there is an equilibrium point in which every player uses color 1. In this point players (s i , t i ) use this set of edge disjoint paths and players (a i , b i ) use the paths (a i , s i , b i ). Conversely, if there is a better Nash equilibrium then it uses only one color. So, every (s i , t i ) player uses only edges of G, because otherwise there is a conflict with (a i , b i ) players and the number of colors needed is increased. Since players (s i , t i ) can use the same color, the paths they use are edge disjoint. We also point out that the above construction can be used to prove that the problem of finding the best Nash equilibrium (that is the one using the minimum number of different colors) is NP-hard. 
Cost function 3: Maximum congestion
The next cost function is related to the provided bandwidth:
where w(e) is the congestion of e i.e., the number of paths that use edge e. That is, a player's defect is now towards a path with lightly used edges i.e., links where a smaller portion of their bandwidth is used. We point that in this case we only measure the congestion on the edges of a path, so colors become actually irrelevant because a player can always switch to a color that is not used by any of the other paths. The existence of pure Nash equilibria is assured by the following theorem. Related versions of this theorem appear also in ( [5] , Theorem 3) and ( [6] , Theorem 1).
Theorem 3. Pure Nash equilibria according to Cost Function 3 always exist.
Proof. Consider a feasible solution (valid coloring). Such a solution always exists (and can be found e.g. by the algorithm of the previous subsection) and uses at most M colors if there are M players. We define the vector (potential) l = (l M , l M−1 , . . . , l i ) where l i is the number of players with cost equal to i. We then examine every player's strategies. If nobody can defect we are at an equilibrium point. If there is a player of cost k that defects then we have the following. Elements l M , l M−1 , . . . , l k+1 continue having the same values. The player who defects cannot affect these players because in this case his cost would be greater than k and so there would be no defect. l k is reduced by at least one as, at least the defecting player (and maybe some more players with cost determined by him) moves to another, lower indexed l i . Thus, the only elements that can be increased are l k−1 , l k−2 , . . . , l 1 . So, a defection leads to a lexicographically better l, thus at the end we will reach an equilibrium under Cost Function 3.
Theorem 4. The question if a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium can be answered in P-time.
Proof. The proof is based on the following lemma whose proof can be found e.g. in [8] .
Lemma 1. In a weighted graph G the (s, t)-path implied by a minimum spanning tree is a min-max weighted path, i.e. a minimum weight path where we charge a path by the weight of its heaviest edge. Equivalently, each edge e of a minimum spanning tree T of a weighted graph G has the minimum weight among all edges in the cut of G defined by the removal of e from T .
Consider a feasible solution in which the kth player (s k , t k ) uses path p k and color χ k . To check if the solution is an equilibrium we examine if there exists a player who can defect, i.e. a player who can use a different path-color pair with cost less than the current's. To this end, we examine every player and every color χ in turn by first removing every edge of the graph used by a χ-colored path and assigning to each remaining edge the following weight. In the case where χ is the current color of the kth player, we do not remove edges of the current path because the player may use them again. The weight is defined by
where σ i = (p i , χ i ) is the strategy (path-color pair) used by player i. That is, edge e has weight equal to the number of paths using it, increased by 1 to reflect the potential use of e by player k. We then find a minimum spanning tree in the remaining graph with edge weights defined by (5) . The proposed new (s k , t k ) path p is the one implied by the minimum spanning tree. By its construction p does not conflict with any other χ-colored path and by Lemma 1 its cost under cost function 3, max e∈p w(e), is minimum. If this cost is less than the current cost of player k then player k is better off defecting to this new strategy (p, χ ). Conversely, if all colors are examined as above and no better strategy is discovered, then no better strategy exists.
Unfortunately, in revision of a previous version of this paper [15] , the existence of a polynomial algorithm for computing a Nash equilibrium point under Cost Function 3, is still open. The analysis in Theorem 3 of the above reference contains an error in the estimation of the total time. However, this analysis is applicable in computing an equilibrium of an interesting broadcast variant of the problem which we present after the next section.
Returning to Cost Function 3, the problem of finding an equilibrium with fewer colors, is again NP-complete.
Proposition 3. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 3 (Maximum Congestion) is NP-complete.
Proof. See Proposition 1. The main observation is that the proposed equilibria with respect to Cost Function 1, are also equilibria with respect to Cost Function 3.
Cost function 4: Maximum chromatic level
The last cost function is related to the bandwidth too, but from another viewpoint:
where W (e) is the maximum color number (chromatic level) that appears on edge e. That is, now an edge is charged by the highest frequency used on it. Notice that an edge may get greater weight, though it is used by only a few paths.
Proposition 4. Pure Nash equilibria under Cost Function 4 always exist.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 3.
Furthermore, we have
Proposition 5. The question if a strategy profile is a pure Nash equilibrium can be answered in polynomial time.
Proof. Same as for Theorem 4 except that the weight assigned to each edge when we consider M players with strategies (p i , χ i ), i = 1 . . . M and examine color χ for player k is
In this way the cost of an (s, t)-path p equals max e∈p w(e). This cost gets minimized by the (s, t)-path implied by a minimum spanning tree, according to Lemma 1.
Finally, the problem Better Nash is again NP-complete.
Proposition 6. Problem Better Nash under Cost Function 4 (Maximum Chromatic Level) is NP-complete.
Proof. See Proposition 1. Again, the proposed 2-color equilibrium is also an equilibrium for both cost functions 1 and 4.
Maximum congestion: The broadcast case
As promised in Section 5, we study here an interesting variant of the problem where a set of transmitting nodes broadcast a message to every other node in the network, each node using a single channel (color) for its broadcast. Once more, if two nodes use the same edge for their transmission, they must use different colors. Notice that in this case a node transmits via a spanning tree of the graph, since any cycle in the transmission route introduces redundancy. In the game-theoretic approach therefore, a player's strategy consists of a spanning tree denoting the links to be used and a color denoting the wavelength to be used.
We mention that a similar problem is studied in [1] , except that the cost function is the sum of the congestion values, not the maximum congestion. In that setting, the problem of ''minimum congestion spanning trees'' is modeled as a matroid congestion game.
The problem is defined as follows:
• Players: M players (notice that a player's broadcasting node s i , i = 1, . . . , M is not important as every node must be included in a spanning tree).
• Strategies: Pairs σ i = (T i , χ i ) where T i is a spanning tree of the graph and χ i is a color (wavelength). We represent colors as integers in the interval [1. .c]. • Cost: For each player i = 1, . . . , M a cost function g i (σ 1 , . . . , σ M ).
The specific cost function we examine is related to Cost Function 3:
where w(e) is the broadcast congestion of e i.e., the number of different players, i.e. trees (not different paths as with cost function 3) that use edge e. A Nash equilibrium under this setting is a set of spanning trees (strategies) such that no spanning tree can be replaced by another whose maximum congestion edge has less weight. Notice that what we really seek in the above problem is M spanning trees. The assignment of colors to the trees can be done in a straightforward way by an algorithm analogous to that of Section 4 with the only restriction that two trees sharing an edge must be assigned different colors.
Subsequently we shall show that under this cost function a Nash equilibrium point can be computed in polynomial time, by the following algorithm.
Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH(G)
Output Nash equilibrium.
for every e ∈ E dow(e) = 0; for k = 1 to M do T k = ({s k }, ∅); for j = 1 to |V | − 1 do {comment:C is the set of edges that cross the current cutV T k , V − V T k }; Let γ be the edge in C with minimum w; w(γ ) = w(γ ) + 1; Update T k by adding edge γ to it;
VALIDATE(γ ); endfor endfor
Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH inserts one by one the players (k-loop, see above). For each newly inserted player it tries to build a minimum spanning tree T k = (V T k , E T k ) using a variant of Prim's algorithm (where by V T k (resp. E T k ) we denote the set of nodes (resp. edges) already included in the tree T k ). In each step of this process (j-loop) the minimum weight edge γ among those having one endpoint in V T k and the other in V − V T k is selected (as done in Prim's algorithm) and the tree is updated with γ . At each step the number of trees containing e is denoted by w(e). The weight of γ is then increased by one to reflect that it has now been included in the tree under construction. Then function VALIDATE is called for γ .
VALIDATE examines the effect of increasing the weight of γ on the already built trees (those corresponding to players 1 . . . k − 1) and the current tree T k , by discovering players who can defect (function DEFECT) and updating their trees.
Function DEFECT(γ )
Input Edge γ . Output A player i with γ ∈ E T i and who can do better by not using γ .
{comment: C i (e) is the set of edges of G that cross the cut of T i which results if we remove e from T i ; min(C i (e)) is the edge with minimum w in C i (e); } Find i ≤ k for which γ ∈ T i and w(min(C i (γ ))) < w(γ ) − 1; if not found then set i = 0; return i; By ''cut'' of a tree we mean the partition of its nodes into two sets that result if we remove an edge e of the tree. Therefore C i (e) is the set of edges of G that have their endpoints belonging to different sets of the cut. Notice that this definition also applies even if i = k, i.e. for the partially constructed tree T k . In this case, the two sets of a cut contain only the nodes of the partially constructed tree T k .
We now have the following:
Theorem 5. Algorithm COMPUTE-NASH correctly computes in polynomial time, a pure Nash equilibrium of the maximum congestion in the broadcast case.
Proof. The proof of correctness is based on Lemma 1. The basic idea is that of a valid edge: a tree edge e is valid if for every i = 1, . . . , k such that e ∈ T i , w(e) ≤ w (min(C i (e))) + 1, where min(C i (e)) is the minimum cost edge between those in C i (e). In other words e is valid if its weight is at most one greater than any other edge in the cut. The validity condition captures the fact that when a player chooses to use an edge e, w(e) is increased by one to reflect that one more path passes through e. This is the reason we use w(e) ≤ w (min(C i (e))) + 1 rather than w(e) ≤ w (min(C i (e))), as the validity condition. We also point that, according to the definition of C i (e), the validity condition can be applied to edges belonging to already computed trees T i , as well as the tree T k that is currently being built.
The proof now rests on the following claim:
Claim. Assume we have constructed k spanning trees. If every edge of these trees is valid, we have reached an equilibrium.
Proof of the claim. Assume that every edge is valid but one of the spanning trees, say T l can be replaced by another tree T whose heaviest edge is strictly lighter than the heaviest edge of T l (after replacing T l ). Let us introduce subscripts ''B'', and ''A'' to denote the weights of an edge before and after the replacement. Consider the heaviest edge e of T l and the corresponding cut C l (e). If we replace T l by T at least one of the edges, say e , of T crosses C l (e). Since T is a defect for player l, then w A (e ) < w B (e). But w A (e ) = w B (e ) + 1, hence w B (e ) + 1 < w B (e) which contradicts the validity assumption for e in the cut C l (e).
The correctness follows from the following condition which is maintained throughout the j-loop:
Every edge in every tree T i , i = 1, . . . , k is valid, except (maybe) edge γ that is, the current parameter of function VALIDATE. Moreover, when an iteration of the j-loop is concluded (in other words when one more vertex has been added to the spanning tree under construction) every edge in every tree, including the partially constructed tree T k , is valid.
Consider the situation where we start a new j iteration and assume inductively that every edge of every tree is valid. The jth iteration selects the minimum weight edge γ to augment the tree T k and consequently increases its weight, w(γ ), by 1. Edge γ may now become invalid for another tree T i (possibly more than one) because of some other edge in its cut, say edge γ , such that γ = min(C i (γ )) and for which the validity inequality is violated, i.e. w(γ ) < w(γ ) − 1. Edge γ cannot be invalid however for T k as all edges in the newly created cut of T k have weight at least w(γ ) − 1 by the Prim's algorithm criterion of inserting one new edge.
The non-validity of γ for T i results in a sequence of calls to VALIDATE to restore its validity. Each call to VALIDATE restores the validity of γ but possibly spoils the validity of a single edge γ . Notice that when we restore the validity of γ for some tree T i we also restore its validity for every tree since this is done by removing γ from T i and thus restoring its weight to its previous value (one less). Notice also that in the sequence of calls to VALIDATE, every new call has as parameter an edge with weight one less than the previous call because of the validity condition. Therefore, at most M calls to VALIDATE are required after the insertion of a new edge in T k . After the termination of this sequence all edges of all trees are again valid and T k has been augmented by one more edge (and vertex). Notice also, that if an edge e of the current tree T k is found invalid at some point in the sequence of calls of VALIDATE, it can only be replaced by some other edge in C k (e) since any other edge crossing V T k , V − V T k can have weight at least w(e) + 1 by the way the Prim's algorithm constructs a spanning tree. Therefore, tree T k remains connected.
Regarding the complexity of the algorithm we have that an insertion of an edge results in at most M calls to VALIDATE. Each of these calls needs at most O(M|E|) time due to the call to DEFECT (we check at most M trees and in each we try to compute the cheapest edge crossing a cut). Finally, we construct M trees, thus the time needed is O(M 3 |V ||E|) where |V | and |E| are the number of nodes and the number of edges in G respectively.
Conclusions and future work
We have examined the behavior of WDM all-optical networks under a game-theoretic approach and under several cost functions. Our results (summarized in Table 1) show that the complexity of the problems of recognition and computation of pure Nash equilibria varies from polynomial to NP-complete.
As complexity theory and game theory are converging, many more may be done for analyzing network problems. Some suggestions along the lines of this work follow: First, we may analyze WDM routing under the cost-functions 3,4 regarding the complexity of computing an equilibrium. Second, we may try to analyze along the same directions the multicast congestion (MC) problem [28] : we are given a network, that is an undirected graph G = (V , E) and a set of subsets of S j of V (called terminals). We are asked to find a set T j of trees in E each spanning the respective set S j . Let the congestion Table 1 Our results regarding pure Nash equilibria in all-optical networks.
Function
Existence Nash Recognition Computing Better Nash Always  NP-complete  Open  NP-complete  Frequency (color number) Always PTIME PTIME NP-complete Max congestion (paths) Always PTIME Open NP-complete Max frequency Always PTIME Open NP-complete Max congestion-broadcast Always PTIME PTIME Open of an edge e be the number of T j trees that contain e. How can we keep the congestion low? E.g. one may ask to keep the maximum congestion at a minimum level. Again we may try to analyze this problem by defining various analogous cost functions and considering each set of terminals as a player of a suitable non-cooperative game. Furthermore, the problem of a cooperative game formulation may be analyzed in order to limit the overall cost of an equilibrium, that is the total amount of bandwidth needed.
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